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Operation Desert Storm was not a "patriotic triumph" for many U.S.
citizens. Numerous Americans silently disapproved of the war, while others
defiantly created a movement of Gulf War dissenters. This reenactment of the
antiwar movement will be the focus of this paper. More specifically, the paper
will trace the inception, growth and decline of this oppositional movement.
Methodologically, this paper studies the movement's ebbs and flows through a
content analysis of newspapers and an ethnographic case study. In the end, this
study reveals that the slow and steady growth of the movement during the last
months of 1990 was surpassed by a rash of movement activity around the
January onset of the war. Yet, this flurry of activity around the middle of
January became a two-week milestone as the protest size began to shrink in
February and early March.

In 1991 the United States waged a ferocious war on Iraq. Despite
George Bush's insistence that "there is no antiwar movement out there,"
millions of Americans were voicing th~ir objections to pollsters. However,
this disapproval of the war was not limited to survey responses as thousands
of Americans expressed their discontent by protesting in the streets.
By the mid 1990's the existence of these protests had faded from the
public's consciousness. Combining with this "normal citizen" amnesia is the
fact that even some insightful peace scholars have minimized the size of the
protests. For example, peace historian Charles Chatfield (1992) wrote, "So
brief and militarily successful was the [GulfJ war ... that no significant
opposition evolved" (p. xi) and Sociologists Sam Marullo et. al. (1996) said
that the Gulf War inspired only a brief "'minisurge' in peace activism" (p.
10). This paper challenges these characterizations by providing a systematic
count of Gulf War protesters.
PEACE MOVEMENTS AND PROTEST CYCLES
A social movement can be seen as the collective process that occurs
when a less powerful constituency challenges elite targets through nonelectoral techniques. Such challenges are transient in nature, since mobilizations seem to appear and disappear during specific periods. When movements are "active," their intensity seems to fluctuate. Moreover, movements
seem to follow episodes or stages of initial expansion and subsequent
declines.
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These modifications of movement size and activities have been
called "mobilization spirals" (Tarrow, 1989; Lofland, 1992). Tarrow (1989)
suggests that movement spirals are connected to changes in: (1) the production and mediation of symbols that justify the mobilization; (2) the
formation of movement coalitions; (3) the diffusion of activity from small
clusters of activists to large sectors of the general populace; (4) the invention
and modifications of tactics and repertoires of contention; and (5) an increase in the intensity of conflicts with authority figures. Lofland (1992) adds
that antiwar surges follow similar multidimensional patterns (i.e., the
number of participants, the number of activists, the number of endorsing
organizations, the types of funding sources, the extent of public support for
the movement, the degree of elite approval, and changes in media packaging
of the movement).
PROTESTS AGAINST THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Earlier studies have addressed some facets of this antiwar
mobilization. They have looked at the goals of the movement (Hunt and
Benford, 1994; Coy and Woehrle, 1996), the extent of bystander sympathy
for protesters (Pan et. al., 1993; Beamish, et. al., 1995), the structure of
movement organizations (Elbaum, 1992; Epstein, 1992), the impact of
protests on congressional war votes (MacDougall et. al., 1995), and the
importance of identity and value commitments in antiwar activism (Swank,
1993/94; Duncan and Stewart,1995). While these works have contributed to
a rudimentary knowledge of the mobilization, they have limited themselves
to cursory and impressionistic renditions of this movement's protest cycle.
MEmODOLOGICAL CONCERNS: INDICATORS,
SOURCES AND COUNTING PROCEDURES
In contrast to any impressionistic accounts, this study undertakes a
systematic measurement of U.S. protesters. Although the "perfect study"
would have researchers at every American protest, a lack of resources
usually blocks such an occurrence (one researcher cannot simultaneously be
at several cities and not even a team of researchers can observe the
thousands of concurrent protests which stretch from Seattle to Miami).
Hence, logistical impositions routinely necessitate a reliance on secondary
sources.
Various types of secondary sources have been used in movement
research. Though a few studies have used official archival records (i.e., Tilley
et. al., 1975) or activist-generated histories (i.e., Rupp and Taylor, 1987), the
vast majority of studies have used of newspapers for data (i.e., McAdam,
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1982; Taylor and Jodice, 1983; Koopmans, 1993). In fact, around 90% of
protest cycle articles found in Sociological Abstracts have used reporter
informants.
DATA SOURCES FOR miS PROJECT
This study contains personal assessments of a local protest (Swank
1993/1994). The crowd counts of San Diego's mobilization were derived
through the "grid/density" approach (see Jacobs, 1967; Seidler et. al., 1976).
This "grid/density" approach breaks the crowd into separate quadrants,
counts the number of people in a single quadrant, and then multiplies this
single quadrant count by the total number of quadrants. Although this
approach has some limitations -- researchers may not create the proper
number of quadrants or the density between quadrants may vary -- the overall system is relatively sound. That is, the "grid/density" approach is more
reliable than intuitional guesstimates since it standardizes measurement
protocols while other methods do not.
After completing this study of a regional protest, I saw three reasons
to construct a national sample. First, there could be generalizability
problems if there is no convergence between the San Diego and national
protest cycles. Second, a national sample frame seemed appropriate since
the protests challenged a federal target. Finally, I assumed the inclusion of
several information sources would enhance the validity of this project. That
is, questions of measurement reliability can be explored by examining the
extent of agreement or disagreement between press reports and the grid!
density approach.
PONDERING mE RELIABILI1Y
OF SECONDARY SOURCES
The reliability of size estimation hinges on the issues of
"selectiveness," "standardization," and "bias" (Olzak, 1989; Ruch and
Ohlemacher, 1992). When addressing selectiveness, we should ask about the
frequency in which a source covered the number of protests for a given
locale (i.e., the percentage of Southern Californian demonstrations covered
by the San Diego Union-Tribune). Clearly those sources which miss most
protests are extremely unreliable. For standardization, one can ask whether
the estimator used some uniformed methods of computing crowd sizes.
When addressing bias, we must question whether the observer's political
loyalties caused them to inflate or deflate the size of the actual crowd.
Communication studies suggest that news reports routinely founder
on all three accounts (Gamson and Wolfson, 1993). Kielbowicz and Schrer's
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(1986) review essay noted that: (1) reporters commonly neglect the substance of political critiques, instead focusing on the dramatic and unique
vestiges of the movement; (2) reporters tend to disproportionately rely on
the statements of conventional authorities to define the movement;
(3) editors customarily send novice "general assignment" reporters to
protests; (4) the beat schedules of reporters affects the probability of events
being covered; (5) the proximity between a media outlet and the protest site
affects the nature of media coverage; and (6) reporters' identities, political
commitments, and conceptions of professional norms influence the type of
coverage that movements attain.
Two "empirical" studies substantiate these claims of selective
coverage. Snyder and Kelly (1977) discovered that the New York Times ran
a grand total of 22 protest stories in 1968. Conversely, the local papers of
43 U.S. cities covered 120 protests during the same contentious year (this
means that Times missed around 81% of the protests covered by other
papers). A later study by McCarthy, McPhail and Smith (1996) showed that
other papers mirrored the Times' selectivity problems, finding that only 7%
of the 1,856 protests logged in Washington police files were ever covered by
the New York Times, Washington Post, ABC, NBC, and CBS. Moreover, all
sources but the Washington Post covered less than 2% of the total protests
(the Post was best at 6 percent).
This media/movement discrepancy also bled into antiwar coverage.
Historian W.J. Rorabaugh (1989) suggests that the national and Bay Area
newspapers frequently ignored the Free Speech and antiwar demonstrations
that occurred at the University of California in the 1960's. Todd Gitlin
(1982) and Melvin Small (1994) argued that newspapers repeatedly missed
small and medium-size protests because editors quickly grew tired of
covering "ordinary" or "conventional" demonstrations against the Vietnam
war. Subsequently, the protests that occurred late in the protest cycle had
to exhibit "sensational" flair in order to be considered "news-worthy" events
(e.g., the spectacle of enormous size, or the exhibition of illicit behaviors by
protesters).
Recent studies indicate that the "corporate" media tried to suppress
images of Gulf War opposition. A study of CBS, NBC, and ABC's nightly
news casts found that of the 2,855 minutes of pre-January 3, 1991 reports on
"Desert Shield" that only 29 minutes were dedicated to stories of opposition
to military intervention (Lee and Devitt, 1991), while national newspapers
devoted an average of 2.7% percent of their war stories to features on the
peace movements (Dennis, 1992). Similarly, a study of Washington Post front
pages articles found that 2% of "Gulf War" articles focused on antiwar
activists (Kaid et. al., 1993) and a content analysis of three Kentucky
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newspapers found that 4% of all Persian Gulf War reports contained
information on demonstrations (Haney, 1993).
Adding to this issue of media selectivity is the problem of biased
reporting. During the stormy sixties, Daniel Hallin (1986) found that almost
every CBS news story portrayed antiwar protesters as "traitors," "hard-core
deviants," and "young misfits who threatened law and order." Similarly, the
reports on Gulf War protests were generally presented in a stigmatized
frame. Resse and Buckalew (1995) found that Texan reporters implied that
Gulf War protesters were violent, and Hackett and Zhao (1994) noted that
28% of printed stories portrayed activists as "oddballs" who were ill-informed
and immature, while 46% of the stories stated that the protesters were
"enemies" of the nation.
Several studies suggest that this dislike of activists transfers into
skewed size estimates. Anecdotally, Todd Gitlin (1982) noticed that a New
York Times reporter admitted that he intentionally relied on police estimates
although he knew they were severe undercounts and Small's book, Covering
Dissent, shows how mainstream newspapers deflated movement counts by
using police estimates to guide their front page headlines. In a similar light,
Leon Mann's (1974) study of 22 U.S. newspapers found a statistical
relationship between a paper's editorial position of the Vietnamese conflict
and its ability to count people at antiwar protesters. That is, after classifying
papers into the categories of "dove" or "hawk," Mann found that the four
"dove" papers put 33,000 participants at a 1965 demonstration, while the
seven "hawk" papers provided the average estimate of 20,600 for the same
event. Finally, a paper by Murray Edelman (1986) highlights the extent of
paper undercounts. After collecting estimates through the grid/density
approach, Edelman turned to the pages of the San Francisco Chronicle and
New York Times for their official accounts. Predictably, Edelman found that
paper estimates for leftist demonstrations were always smaller than his
grid/density counts of the same event (i.e., a demonstration against the
Moral Majority produced a police estimate of 100 while the grid found 1000,
an anti-KKK rally found a police count of 100-200 as the grid showed 350,
and a Jesse Jackson speech drew 375 according to the police and 2000
according to the grid).
IMPROVING THE RELIABIU1Y OF
NEWSPAPERS BY EXPANDING THE SAMPLE SIZE
Listening to methodologists (i.e., Franzosi, 1987; Meyer, 1991), I
created a stratified sample of several newspapers. The first stratum was
composed of national news-sources: three news services (United Press
International, Gannett, Newsbank) and four national papers (The New York
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Times, Los Angeles Tunes, Washington Post, and USA Today). The second
stratum consisted of local papers which were situated in all regions of the
country.
With the help of the Census Bureau's County and City Data Book
(1994) the country was divided up into ten separate regions (New England,
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central,
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific and Southwest).
With these categories in place, I searched the largest newspapers in each
subsection (largest number of daily subscribers). After using the directory
Newspapers Online, I added the Boston Globe, Philadelphia Enquirer, Atlanta
Constitution,Houston Post ,Louisville-CourierJoumai,St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Chicago Tribune, Denver Post, San Francisco Chronicle, and the Seattle Times

to the sample.
Supplementing these mainstream sources was a third stratum of
"alternative" periodicals. Since the U.S. lacks a daily left paper, I had a
choice between a list of weekly papers and monthly periodicals. After
scanning the "alternative presses" of Z Magazine, The Progressive, Utne
Reader, and In these Times, I added the New York weekly, the National
Guardian, to the sample since every issue of the Guardian from December
to March had a special section on the protests.
Finally, I turned to a peace movement paper. Although the national
organizations had fragmentary movement histories, a small group called the
Nuclear Resisters collected an extensive list of protests. This Phoenix based
collective became the "unofficial" clearinghouse of activist manuscripts
because hundreds of antiwar coalitions faxed their reports to their Arizona
office. This tiny group was so efficient in its efforts that its newsletter was
routinely inundated with several pages of antiwar information.
DATA COLLECTION AND CODING PROCEDURES

I limited myself to articles that fell within a ten month time frame
(August 1990 and May 1991). Furthermore, this selection of articles
approximates a census of all printed reports since I used bounded and
computerized indexes to locate the relevant articles. In the end, the papers
yielded a total of 842 stories that appeared under the categories of "antiwar,"
"demonstrations," "Persian Gulf War." 1

1
The breakdown of articles for each source is as follows: NeMI$bank n= 141; Los Angeles
Times n=ll7; Washington Post n=82; UPJ n=81; San Francisco Chronicle n=64; USA Today
n=SO; Boston Globe n=46; Seattle Times n=42; New Yotk Times n=37; Atlanta Constitution
n=27; Denver Post n=21; Gannett n=25; National GUIJI'dian n=22; St. Louis Post Dispatch
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FINDINGS
SAN DIEGO
Figure 1 reveals the general augmentation, expansion, and eventual
decline in protest activity in San Diego, California. This graph indicates that
the movement had a very small base of active protesters in the preDecember days. Then the new year brought hordes of activists into the
streets of San Diego. In fact, San Diego experienced some of its largest
protests ever in the week that followed the bombardment of Iraq (January
16, 1991 ). Yet, this rush of new activists began to taper off shortly thereafter
since the number of active protesters significantly shrunk by the month of
February.

RgLre 1: San Dego Protests
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n=l9; Chicago Tribune n=11; Louisvi/Je-Courierloumal n=11; Philadelphia Enquirer n=1S
Houston Post, n=l3).
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While Figure 1 reveals the general contours of the San Diego
protest cycle, some further details are in order. In early August 1990, a few
days after Bush's placement of troops in Saudi Arabia, a cluster of eight full
time activists from Greenpeace, the Peace Resource Center, Alliance for
Survival, Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft, Middle East
Cultural and Information Center, National Lawyers Guild, and the Friends
of Nicaraguan Culture formed the San Diego Coalition for Peace in the
Middle East (SDCPME). This newly created coalition agreed to hold its first
protest on October 20, 1990.
On October 20, the Coalition for Peace in the Middle East held its
first "No blood for oil" protest (n=400). The date of this protest was
significant because it became the first day of coordinated protests among
over 20 different U.S. cities. It should be noted that participants were
predominantly people affiliated with one of the endorsing groups.
After this demonstration, the SDCPME began an extensive
recruiting drive. It held its first "public" organizational meeting in which the
group spent five hours of debating the nuances of protest planning. After
some heated exchanges, the group began to formalize its structure by
creating special committees that would be responsible for certain tasks (i.e.,
working with the media, outreach to new communities, information
gathering, and legal matters). When meeting ended, the group decided to
sponsor weekly Sunday vigils and hold a "major demonstration" on Wars
deadline (January 14).
On December 9, 300 hundred people attended the first of many
Sunday vigils in a local metropolitan park. Thereafter, the next month
showed a slow and steady growth in the number of vigil protesters. One
thousand participants attended a December 16 rally while around 800 people
attended the December 23 and December 30 vigils. Then in January the
crowds doubled their size, with the January 6 and January 13 vigils growing
to 2,000 and 2,500 people respectively. Finally, the students at the University
of California in San Diego (UCSD) threw a teach-in which drew 1000
participants.
This gradual growth in protest size preceeded a dramatic surge of
activism. The January 14 "eve of the bombing" vigil drew 10,000 people to
a Monday night protest. This candlelight vigil attracted many "first time"
protestors and had a very civil tone. Then on January 16, a UCSD "die-in"
drew 1000 participants and SDCPME impromptu January 17 protest
attracted 4,500 protestors.
The San Diego organizers quickly learned that this influx of activists
would be short-lived and that the January 14 event would represent the peak
number of demonstrators and activities. By January 20, an extremely sedate
Sunday vigil drew 2,500 protesters. A more rambunctious crowd of 1,800
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showed up for a January 27 protest, while the February 23 demonstration
which foreshadowed the looming land invasion drew only 1000 participants.
By March 3, only 300 "longtime activists" attended the final Gulf War march.
NATIONAL PROTESTS
The sources found 1,225,567 activists at a total of 1,365 protests. A
large percentage of this grand total was found in the two days of national
protest. Table 1 shows that national protests in San Francisco and
Washington on January 19 each drew more than 40,000 participants while
the same streets were filled with over 90,000 activists the preceding weekend.
-----------~~----·-----

Table 1: The Largest Protests in U.S. Cities
City

Size

Washington (l/26)

154.565

San Francisco ( 1/26)

95,000

San Francisco (1/19)
Washington (1/19)
Seattle (l/14)

49,000
40,290
30.000

Portland (1112)
New York (10/20)
Boston (12/1)

14,000
13.000
12.000

Minneapolis (l/13)
San Francisco (1/15)
San Francisco (1/16)
Portland (1/18)

10,000
10.000
10.000
10,000

San Francisco ( 10/20)
San Diego (1/14)

8,000
8,000

New York (l/17)
San Francisco (2./21)
Chicago (l/12)
San Francisco (I /21)
Los Angeles (1/12)
Portland (2/ 16)
San Francisco ( 1/17)
Los Angeles (211 )
New York (2/17)

7,500
7,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
5,700
5,500
5,500

City

Size

Seattle (1/19)
Portland (1/11)
Chicago (1/14)
New York (1/14)
Washington ( 1/14)
Chicopee, MA (1/15)
New York (l/15)
Austin, TS (1/16)
Minneapolis (l/16)
New York (1116)
Portland (1/16)
San Diego (1/16)
San Francisco ( 1/16)
San Antonio (1/29)
Chicago (12/8)
Austin (1/11)
Chicago (l/17)
Washington (1115)
Seattle ( 12/ I)
Denver ( 1/12)
Los Angeles (1/13)
Milwaukee (l/14)
Atlanta (1/15)
Boston (1/15)
Cincinnati (1115)
Minneapolis ( 1117)
Los Angeles (1/26)
Oakland (2/24)
San Deign (1/19)

5,200
5,000
5,000
5,000
5.000
5,000
5.000
5,000
5,000
5.000
5.000
5,000
5,000
5.000
4.500
4.500
4,300
4,200
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
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Although the largest protests were of the national sort, local antiwar
groups mustered up some fairly large protests. Table 1 reveals that eight
regional protests drew at least 10,000 participants and 41 drew between
9,999 and 4,000 adherents. Moreover, Table 1 ignores the fact that 24 vigils
drew around 3,000 to 4,000 demonstrators, 2 and thirty-six antiwar events
amassed between 2,000 and 3,000 dissenters.'
When adding the time line to these protest counts one sees some
similar patterns of movement growth in both the national and San Diego
settings (for Figures 1 and 2 the correlation coefficient equals .80). Both
figures show that the movement swelled in size during the last two weeks of
January 1991. Moreover, both figures show a marked decrease in protests
in early February with a small increase in the late days of February.
A more detailed comparison of these data reveals some slight
divergences between the nation's and San Diego's protest waves. Protests
were staged earlier in the national scene. Right after the first troop
deployment (late August to early September 1990), several cities saw small
and sporadic protests. In fact, cities such as Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis
and Tucson witnessed small protests in early August, and New York City
experienced a protest of around 2,200 activists on September 13.
During this September and early October stint, a band of seasoned
activists were assembling the vestiges of the first national coalition. On
October 20, the newly formed Coalition Against U.S. Intervention in the
Middle East convinced a confederation of fledgling groups to hold
concurrent protests in their respective cities.4 While some of these twenty
simultaneous protests carried a large number of activists (New York 11,900
or San Francisco 7,000), most protests gathered around 400 to 500
protestors (i.e., Los Angeles, Minneapolis, or Missoula, Montana).

2
The twenty-four protests that collected between 3,000 and 4,000 demonstrators resided in
New York City (2), San Jose (2), UC Berkeley (2), UC Santa Cruz (2), UC Santa Barbara (2),
Atlanta, Bellingham, WA, Boulder, CO, Boston, Cincinnati, Denver, Los Angeles, Milwaukee,
Nevada Test Site, Philadelphia, San Diego, St. Louis, UCLA, and Washington.
3
The thirty-six demonstrations that attracted between 2,000 and 3,000 protestors occurred
in Los Angeles (5), Seattle (3), Boston (2), Des Moines (2), Montpelier, VT(2), New York City
(2), University of Wisconsin (2), Denver, Eugene, Houston, Ohio State University, Missoula,
Oakland, Olympia, WA, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, University of
Indiana, University of Michigan, University of Washington, UC Berkeley, Washington and
Western Washington University.

• On this date protests occurred in Atlanta, Baton Rogue, Birmingham, Boston, Chicopee,
WA, Cleveland, Dallas, Honolulu, Houston, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Missoula,
MN, New York, Olympia, Philadelphia, Portland, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington.
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This coordinated event became an anomaly and lasted only one day
(the next national protests follow three months later). In November, the
leadership of local antiwar coalitions delayed further attempts to build a
national movement. Instead regional groups focused on outreach and
recruitment efforts. This meant that the cadre of peace activists put most of
their efforts into creating pools of adherents who would be willing to protest
in future events. Subsequently, this strategy resulted in the enactment of
small and irregularly placed protests throughout the month of November.
While the community activists were trying to recruit new
sympathizers, a handful of college protest were starting to evolve. 5 Under
the banner of growing student opposition, a handful of private universities
generated protests (i.e., Stanford, Columbia, Dartmouth, Brandies, and
Notre Dame). On the west coast, six of the seven University of California
campuses saw protests on their grassy compounds (i.e., 1,200 demonstrators
at both UC Santa Cruz and UC Santa Barbara), and Montana State and the

' In fact the sources for this study found 27 college protests during this November period.
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University of Utah saw their lecture halls turn into teach-ins. Even the large
Midwestern universities saw antiwar activities in November (i.e., November
protests drew 1,500 at the University of Michigan, 600 at the University of
Wisconsin, 200 at Iowa State and 100 at the University of Kansas).
In December, the movement experienced a new synergy. The
community and college protests added new members, and these separate
mobilizations began uniting forces more regularly. In the pre-Christmas
weeks of December, the political hubs of this country were able to generate
protests that numbered in the thousands (i.e., Boston 11,000, Chicago 4,500
or New York City 5,000). At the same time, mid-size communities such as
Atlanta, Detroit, Lincoln, Milwaukee, and Phoenix were arranging protests
that netted hundreds of activists while smaller towns like Akron, Evanston,
Stratford, and Annapolis were generating smaller gatherings.
This gradual and incremental growth stopped in the month of
January. The nation saw a flurry of protests by the middle part of the month
(85 protests on January 14, 144 on January 15, 95 on January 16, and 133
on January 17). Adding to the increase of events was a drastic increase int
the size of these events (each day from January 14 to January 17 had over
80,000 U.S. protestors). In fact, the outpouring was so immense that 31
protests surpassed the 5,000 mark from January 12 to January 26.
There were several aspects to this galvanized state of the movement.
By early January, many of the previously mobilized centers became meccas
of activism (i.e., San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, or New York
City). For cities of this sort, protests routinely numbered in the thousands
during this January peak. Moreover, the traditional weekly protests were
supplanted by successive protests that occurred every day of the week.
Yet, one would be wrong to conclude that this proliferation and
escalation of protests were confined to the "progressive" sites of the United
States. Cities in America's heartland also saw an enormous rush of activism
in January. From January 12 to 26 cities such as Baltimore, Cincinnati, Des
Moines, Detroit, Fort Collins, Little Rock, Milwaukee, Missoula, New
Orleans, Salt Lake City, St. Louis, and Tallahassee had protests that
exceeded 1000 participants. Also in that same time span, some medium sized
towns such as Albuquerque, Fort Wayne, Duluth, Hartford, Iowa City,
Knoxville, Rockford, Sacramento, and Tampa had protests that almost
reached the 1000 person plateau. Even small towns such as Boise, Bozeman,
Flagstaff, Lansing, Omaha, Rapid City, and Willmington created protests
that surpassed 500 participants.
Meanwhile, the spark of activism was igniting on college campuses.
The campuses which experienced earlier protests were hopping with student
demonstrations. Both research institutes (like Indiana University, the
Universities of Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin) and some private
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settings (such as Stanford, Columbia, Harvard, and USC) held protests that
went beyond crowds of one thousand. 6 Previously dormant campuses also
become alive with protests. For example, protests at western schools drew
over 300 at Brigham Young, Colorado College, Western Washington
University and San Diego City College, while Midwestern protests drew
crowds of 700 at Kent State, 700 at Michigan State, 500 at Northwestern,
and 1000 at Purdue.
By the end of January this plethora of local protests began to amass
into enormous national demonstrations. On January 19, over 35,000
protesters from the entire country visited the cities of San Francisco and
Washington. But, these first national protests were simply a foreshadowing
of the enormous ones held the following week. On January 26, the oval in
our national capital had around 120,000 protesters and the Golden Gate
Bridge held over 75,000 protesters.
While these national protests were large, one could say that this
pinnacle of activism was a fleeting phenomenon. By the first weeks of
February, our newspapers reported the public demonstrations receded to
December like numbers. This supposed contraction took three routes. First,
the smaller urban centers that had sudden protests around January 15 halted
their spontaneous protests by February. Thus, secluded cities such
Shreveport, Boise or El Paso discontinued their brief flurry of protests after
the Pentagon promised an "easy" rout of Iraq. Second, the political hotbeds
were unable to sustain their peak of January activism (i.e., a citywide protest
in Chicago on January 12 drew 6,000 while the same call for protests
gathered 600 on February 16, or the Minneapolis demonstrations fell from
a height of 10,000 January 13 protestors to 600 on February 10). Third,
sources suggest that protests on college campuses almost evaporated
between February 1 and February 14 (the papers claim that only seven
protests happened on U.S. campuses in this two-week period).
Fearing a pending March invasion of Kuwait, movement leadership
tried to counteract the movement's February slump. However, the attempts
to revitalize this shrinking movement were met with moderate results. A few
local coalitions could resurrect somewhat big crowds in late February (i.e.,
3,000 in Boulder and Seattle), but these larger February protests were rare
events and never reached their previous peaks. In fact, the last two weeks
of February only netted three protests that crested around 5,000 activists,
and the four next largest protests in this period barely passed the 3,000
mark. Similarly, attempts to rekindle a withering campus movement

6

The University of California campuses at Berkeley, Davis, Los Angeles, San Diego, Santa
Barbara, and Santa Cruz had numerous protests that exceeded that 1500 mark.
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produced minimal results. For example, on February 21, the day of "national
college dissent" attracted a small list of 22 participating campuses. Further,
the largest size of these protests numbered 600 at the University of Oregon,
while the other protests fell in the 500 to 100 range. This modest upswing
in activism was the last hurrah for the movement. By the first days of March,
the February practices of dwindling protests was juxtaposed by a glaring
absence of protests.
DISCUSSION
One can reach several conclusions from this study. First, the
relatively strong correlation between the size of San Diegan and national
mobilizations suggests that this paper captures the general contours of this
phenomena. Second, the absence of operational definitions for "maxi,"
"midi," or "mini" surges would not preclude us from asserting that this was
a "significant opposition" in many ways. That is, one would probably agree
that minisurges do not have over one million participants or that a minisurge
would not have one of the largest protests in Washington history (Bryant,
1993, suggests that the Washington Post has only seen thirteen protests which
were larger than the January 27 Gulf War protests). Furthermore, one
would not call the Gulf War protests a "small mobilization" since the size of
every 1982 mobilization did not surpass the size of this antiwar movement
(McCarthy et. al., 1996). Finally, this study found 74 Gulf War protests with
over 3,000 participants, while a thirty-year study of Washington Post articles
found only 43 protests that reached that plateau (Everett, 1992).
Nevertheless, Gulf demonstrations should not be considered the
biggest antiwar movement in U.S. history. These protests did not reach the
heights of the 600,000 demonstrators at the 1969 Vietnam War Moratorium
or the 500,000 at the 1971 Vietnam "Out Now" rally (numbers by Bryant
1993). Similarly, it is clear that the 1990's college protest scene did not
match the estimated 4,350,000 student protestors of the 1960's and 1970s
(Heinemen, 1993, p. 249).
However a strictly numerical comparison can be misleading. Each
mobilization was set in different socio-historical contexts. The Presidential
rationales for the wars were different. One war was supposedly stopping the
"spreading cancer of Communism," while the other war was said to be the
freeing of a virtuous country from a rogue Arab state. The fate of the wars
also differed. One war required a draft, had higher causalities, and lasted
three decades, while the Gulf War was seen as quick drubbing of Iraq which
cost few American lives. Moreover, the media's played different roles in
each war. The media removed sights of mutilation from Gulf War footage
while the images of death from Southeast Asia were consistently brought
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into American family rooms. Finally, it may have been easier to organize an
antiwar mobilization in the sixties since college students had more free time
and there were blocks of seasoned activists who could siphon off the civil
rights movement.
Since contemporary activists face such an unconducive situation, one
may be surprised by the existence of any Gulf War protests. Others may be
shocked by the anomaly of a proactive antiwar movement. That is,
researchers should take note of that this mobilization preceded the bombing
while most U.S. antiwar movements were reactions to ongoing wars (keep
in mind that first national protest against Vietnam came after years of
American involvement in that "police action"). Hence, a two-folded
conclusion emerges. This antiwar movement showed an initial capacity to
mobilize early protests, however these capacities were quickly tapped as the
movement shrunk into abeyance within a few months.
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